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In the conventional CAPM model only a single risk factor is considered. However, using a world 
market portfolio to estimate systematic risk in national portfolios little of the required rate of 
return  is  explained  in  developing  as  compared  to  developed  countries.  Adding  a  factor 
representing  institutional  risk  the  predictive  power  increases  substantially.  By  stressing 
importance of property and investor rights in this fashion, we add to the research on international 
differences in R
2 initiated by Morck et al. (2000). Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that stock price synchronicy depends on the institutional quality.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the required rate of return on investments a special risk premium labeled institutional 
risk  should  be  included.  Different  countries  present  different  institutional  risks  for 
investors. The various risk factors tied to the institutional framework set the rules of the 
game facing the investors. La Porta et al (1997) find that the origin of legal systems and 
the strength of investor protection determine the size of capital markets. In line with these 
findings Gugler et al. (2004) conclude that the origin of the legal system is the single 
most important determinant of investment performance. The rules can be of a supportive 
nature or make long-term investments hazardous due to the lack of secure property rights. 
It is more or less evident that investors must use a higher discount rate in evaluations of 
investments in countries where property rights are weekly protected.  
 
How to account for the institutional risk has not received much attention in the finance 
literature, even though the concept “political risk” is sometimes mentioned. However, a 
formal treatment is not offered. With a few exceptions, the mechanisms through which 
weak institutions in general and property right  systems in particular influence capital 
markets have largely been overlooked. One exception is Morck et al. (2000), who address 
the question why stock prices display more synchronic movements in less developed 
economies than in rich economies.  
 
Morck et al. (2000) find that institutional risk in the form of insecure property rights can 
explain  why  systematic  risk  to  a  larger  extent  determines  rate  of  return  on  stock  in 
developing  than  in  developed  economies.  The  puzzle  they  are  addressing  is  the 
significantly higher R
2 in CAPM models for the emerging than rich economies. They also 
have a local perspective where the rate of return on individual stocks is explained by co-
movement with national market portfolios. Our approach differs from Morck et al. by 
using a global perspective in which we study how the rate of return on national portfolios 
can be explained by co-movement with a world market portfolio. Using such a global 
perspective we find  R
2 adopting reverse behavior. The world market portfolio explains 
more  of  the  rate  of  return  of  national  portfolios  for  rich  than  developing  countries.      
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Similar to Morck et al. (2000) we find that the security of property rights is important in 
an analysis of required rate of return on stocks in developed and developing countries.  
 
After  showing  that  security  of  property  rights  is  important  we  estimate  the  size  of 
“institutional risk premium” in different countries. It turns out that the level of property 
and investor protection is a systematic risk that is priced in the national stock exchanges. 
Therefore, to understand the required rate of return in different countries one should add 
legal uncertainty as an additional factor to market risk. 
 
But it is one thing to propose the necessity to add an “institutional risk premium” and 
another thing to prove the existences of such risk premiums and estimate the size of such 
risk premiums. One reason why few attempts have been made so far is the difficulty to 
empirically quantify and price institutional risk. The purpose of this paper is to show the 
existence  of  property  risk  premiums  and  measure  their  magnitude  in  countries  with 
differing property rights protection. 
 
The paper starts, in section 2, with a discussion of what is meant by institutional risk and 
how this affects the cost of capital. How to calculate capital costs and risk premiums for 
assets with political risk is the subject matter of section 3. The data used in our empirical 
analysis is presented in section 4. The empirical findings are analysed in section 5. The 
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2. Property rights, contracts and investments 
 
Investments are risky; a cost in the form of a capital outlay is taken today, while the 
benefits  represented  by  positive  net  cash  flows  lie  in  the  future.  An  investment  is 
therefore like a deferred exchange where a payment is made today in return for enhanced 
future consumption. When the future unfolds it might turn out that the products produced 
by the new capital (the investment) cannot be sold at profitable prices. 
 
This is a risk that every entrepreneur has to face. But in addition to this risk there might 
be an institutional risk caused by insecure property rights and a defective judicial system 
that makes it difficult to enforce contracts in an effective way. Secure property rights and 
contract enforcement were put forward already by David Hume and Adam Smith as two 
of the most important institutional factors for the prosperity of a nation. According to 
Kasper  and  Streit  (1998),  David  Hume  and  Adam  Smith  stress  three  institutions  of 
fundamental  importance  for  economic  progress  and  welfare:  “(…)  the  guarantee  of 
property rights, the free transfer of property by voluntary contractual agreement, and the 
keeping of promises made” (p 20). In other words, secure property rights, freedom of 
contracts  and  enforcement  of  agreements  are  basic  cornerstones  in  the  quest  for 
prosperity. 
 
Secure property rights, freedom of contracts and enforcement of agreements are the basic 
parts of the institutional framework within which an economy is organized. It is the task 
of the state to develop a well functioning and adequate institutional framework through 
formal  rules.  According  to  North  (1990):  “(…)  formal  rules  include  political  (and 
judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts” (p 47). By economic rules North means 
property rights which are defined as: “(…) the bundle of rights over the use and the 
income to be derived from property and the ability to alienate an asset or a resource” (p 
47). The links to investments are clear as investments mean the creation of new assets. 
Furthermore, North ascertains a hierarchical order between rules in the sense that: “the 
rules descend from polities to property rights to individual contracts” (p 52). According 
to North (1990) and Williamson (2000), these institutions are very stable over time.        
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Hernando de Soto (2000) agues powerfully that the explanation for the varying degree to 
which countries succeed to support capital formation and accumulation is to be found in 
the legal structure of the property rights system of the western world. de Soto claims that: 
“When advanced nations pulled together all the information and rules about their known 
assets  and  established  property  systems  that  tracked  their  economic  evolution,  they 
gathered into one order the whole institutional process that underpins the creation of 
capital. If capitalism had a mind, it would be located in the legal property system” (p 
65). 
 
In other words it is through polity a nation can influence the institutional framework to 
stimulate investments and growth. The institutional framework might be of a kind that 
makes investors certain that no one else will appropriate the fruits of their investments or 
the framework might be one that makes investors think that there is a risk that someone 
else will reap the benefits. If the property rights are insecure long-term investments will 
be hampered and come at the cost of lower welfare.  
 
If  property  rights  are  not  sufficiently  safeguarded  investors  will  ipso  facto  require  a 
higher return on their investments in order to supply capital, which in turn raises the cost 
of capital for firms and entrepreneurs. Assume that a typical firm has the following profit 
function:  
 
  rK wL PQ                     (2.1) 
 
where π is firm profit, P is price, Q quantity sold, w wage, L labor, r required rate of 
return and K capital. In this profit function P = f(Q) and Q = f (K,L). One first order 







 ) , (                 (2.2) 
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Given equations 2.1, marginal rate of return on capital and labor should equal the cost of 
capital, r, and the wage rate, w, respectively. For our purpose only the marginal rate of 
return on capital and equation 2.2 are of interest. We will refer to the left hand side of 
equation 2.2  ( ) ) , ( K L fK P   )  as  the  marginal  rate  of  return  on  capital  (mrrk). (Note 
that ) (I s Investment K   ) The cost of capital, r, will simply be the opportunity cost of 
capital. For investors to be willing to supply financial capital for investments, they will 
require a return, r, on their capital.  
 
The return, r, that investors require depends on the systematic risk of the investment (see 
next section). Systematic risk is risk that is non-diversifiable.  
 
Now suppose that the protection of investors for some reason is weak and the probability 
that investors will receive their return, r, is less than one. Given insecure property rights 
investors will require a return that is higher than r in equation 2.2. Insecure property 
rights will raise the cost of capital which in turn decreases investment. Figure 1 inspired 
by Mueller (2003) illustrates this relationship. A state that is able to lower the cost of 
capital from r2 to r1 through more secure property rights will stimulate investments and 
thereby also growth and welfare. 
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3. Risk, return and portfolio theory  
 
Conventional investment theory holds that investors will evaluate alternative investments 
based on the net present value (NPV). According to the NPV rule, investments should be 
evaluated according to the expected cash flows (CF) minus the expected investment costs 
(I). The only project with expected positive net present values should be initiated (NPV = 
PV – I). When calculating the present value of cash flows generated by an investment, 
one uses a discount factor;1/(1 + r), where r is the discount rate. The discount rate is also 
referred to as the required rate of return or as the cost of capital. For risk free projects the 
required rate of return equals the risk free interest rate, which also serves as a reference 
when valuing risky assets. The PV of future cash flows is calculated as follows
1:   
 










1 ) 1 (
                 (3.1) 
 
The discount rate will depend on the riskiness of the future cash flows. With increasingly 
risky cash flow the discount rate will be accordingly  higher. As the discount rate, r, 
increases the present value declines and the aggregate number of investments declines.  
 
The crucial question is therefore how to determine the size of the discount rate and the 
risk associated with various assets. We argue that the discount rate can be broken down 
into  a  multitude  of  components,  among  which  property  rights  protection  is  one. 
Accordingly the discounted present value formula should be:      
 
  










1 ) 1 (
            (3.2) 
 
                                                 
1 The present value of future cash flows from all investments made by a firm is equal to the market value of 
a firm.        
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where, rf is the risk free interest rate, RPp the risk premium associated with weak property 
right protection, and RPo a “general” risk premium.
2 
  
The  conventional  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM)  makes  a  distinction  between 
diversifiable firm specific risk and non-diversifiable systematic risk. Because the specific 
risk can be diversified away it is only the remaining non-diversifiable risk that matters for 
the  pricing  of  the  asset,  i.e.  investors  are  only  compensated  for  the  systematic  non-
diversifiable risk.  
 
As a consequence, the return r that investors require depends on the systematic risk of the 
investment  (see  next  section).  On  a  global  capital  market  firm  specific  risk  can  be 
diversified away. However the institutional risk of insecure property rights and contracts 
is a risk associated with the institutional framework of rules of a country which cannot be 
diversified. This institutional framework is made up by both informal rules like norms, 
customs, tradition and religion and formal rules like property and contract laws and the 
enforcement  of  these  rules.  It  is  primarily  the  formal  rules  that  polity  can  exert  an 
influence  on.  To  change  informal  rules  is  a  much  tougher  task.  According  to  North 
(1990) and Williamson (2000)  this  institutional framework changes  very slowly over 
time. Even change of the formal rules (like property rights rules) and their enforcement 
tend to take decades to implement. As an investor you are more or less stuck with the 
institutional framework for a considerable time. The prospects of balancing changes in 
the security  of property rights  by having  an international  portfolio are small.  Hence, 
insecure property rights represent a truly systematic risk that, according to the theory, 
(see next section) will increase the cost of capital (the required return on investment, r). 
Raising  the  cost  of  capital  will,  as  shown  in  standard  investment  theory,  decrease 
investment.  
 
According to CAPM, the expected return on a security can be calculated as:  
 
  ) ) ( ( ) ( f m i f i r r E r r E             (3.3) 
                                                 
2 A political risk premium is proposed by Faure & Skogh (2003).      
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where,  i   measures the sensitivity of a security to market risk (systemic risk), rm the 
return on a market portfolio m. The model holds that the expected rate of return should 
equal the risk free interest rate plus a risk premium that varies with . The expected rate 
of return, E(ri), that is obtained, is simply the discount rate r used in equation 3.1 to 
calculate the present value of future cash flows.  The term E(rm) – rf  is the market price 
of risk for efficient portfolios. In this model it is only one factor the market portfolio that 
matters in calculation of the risk premium.  
 
This standard CAPM can be extended into the so-called multi beta CAPM by including 
other factors that influence the size of the risk premium. Merton (1973) is among the first 
to include a number of uncertainty factors that could influence the price of an asset. 
Friend,  Landskroner  and  Losq  (1976)  use,  besides  the  market  portfolio,  inflation 
uncertainty  as  an  additional  factor  that  determined  cost  of  capital.  We  follow  their 
approach and add legal uncertainty in form property rights and protection of investors as 
additional risk factors. 
 
Roll (1977) has in a seminal article leveled critique against the standard CAPM. One of 
Roll’s points is that all assets in the entire world shall be included in the market portfolio 
m. However, in the empirical literature national stock indices like Standard and Poor 500 
and New York Stock Exchange index are used as market portfolios. This is clearly an 
incorrect measure according to Roll’s critique. A step towards a more “correct” market 
portfolio measure is to use an index containing all securities in the entire world. Such an 
index for traded corporate shares is Morgan Stanley world market index. That is the 




Estimation of Beta and the risk premium can be made according to a two pass procedure.
3  
                                                 
3 See e.g. Elton & Gruber (1996)      
  12 
A  number  of  studies  of  CAPM  using  the  two  pass  procedure  have  been  performed. 
Several  of  these  indicate  that  a  two  factor  model  (a  multi-CAPM)  can  be  used.
4 
Consequently, there is some empirical support for use of a model where legal uncertainty 
as well as a market portfolio is included as factors in the calculation of cost of capital. In 
that case the second-pass regression will contain a second factor representing institutional 
risk and look like: 
 
   i p i m i i Risk nal Institutio RP RP r          ˆ         (3.4) 
 
where RPp is the right risk premium due to insufficient safeguarding of property and 
investor rights. 
 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Sharpe & Cooper (1972), Douglas (1968) and Black, Jensen & Scholes (1972).      
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4. Variables, Data and R
2 around the World 
 
To calculate the impact of institutional risk on the risk premium and the required return 
on investments stock exchange data, data about the quality of property rights and global 
market portfolio are needed. Table 1 shows the data we have used for these variables.  
 
Table 1  Description of the Variables 
Country stock 
market indexes 
Measures the stock price performance including dividends. Expressed in US dollars. 




Measures the stock price performance including dividends for 49 developed and 





Assessment of the protection and certainty of property rights. Annual index ranging 
from 1 to 5, with higher scale meaning weaker protection property rights. Source: 





Investor  profile.  Assessment  of  a  number  of  factors  influencing  the  risk  of 
investments. Monthly index  ranging  from 1  to  12,  with  a higher scale  meaning 
stronger  protection  of  investors.  The  index  asses  contract  viability,  risk  of 
expropriation, payment delays and profit repatriation. To facilitate comparisons we 
invert this index so that higher value means weaker investor protection. Source:  
International Country Risk Guide 
 
Returns  
     rit 
 
     rmt 
Different forms of return are calculated.  
Monthly  stock  market  return  on  country  level.  National  stock  market  indexes 
corrected for dividends and in US dollars are used. Source: Morgan Stanley   
World market return calculated with monthly world market index. Source: Morgan 
Stanley   
 
 
Monthly stock market indices compiled by Morgan Stanley are used to calculate the rate 
of return on national stock markets and the world market portfolio.
5 These stock market 
indexes covering a ten year period 1995 to 2005 (129 months more exactly) are expressed 
in US dollars, and corrected for dividends. This assures that the indices are consistently 
defined and include all relevant returns.  As a proxy for the market portfolio  the world 
stock market index from  Morgan  Stanley  is used  which includes  49 developed and 
emerging market country indexes (see table 2). 
 
                                                 
5 MSCI total return indices with gross dividends      
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As  measures  of  institutional  risk  the  Heritage  foundation  index  of  the  insecurity  of 
property rights (PRP) and the index of investor rights protection (IRP) provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are used. The Heritage index ranges from one 
to five, where one indicates strong protection of property rights. It is an annual index 
which is available for the period 1995 to 2005. The property right index is an assessment 
of  the  quality  of  contract  enforcement,  legal  protection  of  property,  existence  of 
corruption in the judicial system and the probability of expropriation.     
 
The ICRG index ranges from 1 to 12, where 1 indicates strong protection. The ICRG 
index  is  a monthly index that here is  used for  the period 1995 to  2005.  In order to 
facilitate comparison of the indexes we invert the investor right index, so that 1 indicates 
strong protection of investors. This index measures factors that have to do with protection 
of property rights and enforcement of contracts.  
 
Table 2 shows the 49 developed and emerging countries that are included in Morgan 
Stanley’s world market portfolio.  The betas and the R
2 from the first pass regression plus 
three other variables are presented. Among the variables from the first pass regression the 
R
2-values are of special interest.  The R
2-values show how much of the national rate of 
return that can be explained by variation of the rate of return on a world market portfolio. 
It is evident that there is a clear difference between developed and emerging countries in 
this respect. The values tend to be much higher in developed countries. The summary 
statistics in Table 3 confirm that this difference is statistically significant. These results 
can be contrasted with those of Morck et al. (2000), who find considerably lower R
2 for 
individual firms in developed countries using national indices as market portfolios. By 
correlating the R
2-values reported by Morck et al. with our values we get a negative 
correlation coefficient that is significant at one percent.  
 
Even though at first sight it might seem odd, our results are in line with those of Morck et 
al. (2000). Our high R
2 –values for developed countries are due to the fact that we use a 
global  perspective  with  the  world  as  the  market  portfolio  and  look  at  how  national 
portfolios can be explained by co-movement with a world market portfolio. With well      
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functioning stock markets with low barriers for international investor opportunities to risk 
reduction through international diversification will be taken advantage of. In other words 
the unique risk of the national market will be diversified away and the systematic risk of 
a world portfolio will to a large extent determine the rate of return on a national portfolio. 
In  Morck et  al.  (2000)  individual stocks are studied. Their  argument is  that  trade in 
individual  stocks  is  to  a  large  extent  driven  by  firm  specific  fundamentals.  In  well 
developed economies the information about firm specific information is easily accessible 
and  more  reliable.  (This  argument  is  further  developed  in  Jin  and  Myers  (2006)). 
Consequently,  firm  specific  fundamentals  will  be  more  important  in  the  pricing  of 
individual  stocks  and  the  co-movement  with  national  indices  lower  (i.e.  lower  R
2  in 
developed countries).  
 
The reason why information is accessible and more trustworthy in developed countries is, 
according to Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006), due to investor protection 
through secure property rights. We will use this to explain why our R
2-values are so low 
for the developing countries. We conclude that there is a need for more factors than a 
market  portfolio  to  explain  the  rate  of  return,  especially  if  we  look  at  developing 
countries. This makes the values for property right protection and investor protection of 
special interest also in our study. Like the R
2-values the values for property right as well 
as investor protection appear to be significantly higher in Table 2. That these protection 
values really are significantly higher is also confirmed by a z-test (see Table 3).       
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i  ˆ  
 
R

















Australia  0.87  0.53  1.00  1.60  0.128 
Austria  0.61  0.22  1.00  1.31  0.122 
Belgium  0.80  0.40  1.00  1.38  0.127 
Canada  1.11  0.68  1.00  1.41  0.160 
Denmark  0.84  0.47  1.00  1.46  0.150 
Finland  1.62  0.40  1.00  1.37  0.221 
France  1.07  0.69  2.00  1.42  0.125 
Germany  1.26  0.65  1.00  1.41  0.105 
Greece  0.95  0.20  2.36  1.74  0.164 
Hong Kong  1.20  0.38  1.00  1.57  0.108 
Ireland  0.85  0.48  1.00  1.35  0.107 
Italy  0.94  0.39  2.00  1.50  0.131 
Japan  0.87  0.37  1.36  1.41  0.011 
Netherlands  1.08  0.68  1.00  1.34  0.106 
New Zealand  0.81  0.30  1.00  1.42  0.106 
Norway  1.07  0.48  1.18  1.46  0.140 
Portugal  0.82  0.32  2.00  1.52  0.107 
Singapore  1.15  0.37  1.00  1.36  0.045 
Spain  1.14  0.59  2.27  1.34  0.178 
Sweden  1.42  0.60  1.64  1.48  0.172 
Switzerland  0.79  0.45  1.27  1.34  0.124 
United Kingdom  0.77  0.69  1.00  1.36  0.103 





i  ˆ  
 
R










Average rate  
of return 
 
Argentina  1.12  0.16  2.73  2.16  0.165 
Brazil  1.85  0.43  3.00  1.98  0.200 
Chile  1.02  0.38  1.00  1.80  0.083 
China  1.14  0.17  4.00  1.89  0.017 
Colombia  0.52  0.05  3.36  1.41  0.179 
Czech Republic  0.63  0.09  2.00  1.55  0.205 
Egypt  0.46  0.04  3.09  1.90  0.274 
Hungary  1.30  0.26  2.00  1.54  0.287 
India  0.65  0.10  3.00  1.89  0.108 
Indonesia  1.46  0.16  3.45  1.96  0.101 
Israel  1.07  0.33  2.00  1.73  0.135 
Jordan  0.15  0.01  2.36  1.77  0.158 
South Korea  1.59  0.24  1.27  1.53  0.149 
Malaysia  0.94  0.14  2.45  1.65  0.044 
Mexico  1.44  0.44  2.91  1.55  0.175 
Morocco  0.06  0.00  3.09  1.76  0.115 
Pakistan  0.41  0.02  3.18  2.43  0.141 
Peru  0.69  0.12  3.45  1.96  0.156 
Philippines  1.06  0.20  2.73  1.90  -0.061 
Poland  1.37  0.27  2.27  1.63  0.166 
Russia  2.13  0.23  3.36  2.15  0.413 
South Africa  1.11  0.35  2.91  1.59  0.114 
Thailand  1.63  0.25  1.36  1.32  0.028 
Taiwan  1.10  0.26  2.09  1.71  0.022 
Turkey  2.15  0.26  2.36  1.87  0.322 
Venezuela  1.01  0.09  3.45  2.27  0.172 
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With regard to average rate of return there are no similar systematic differences between 
the two types of countries. One observation is that there is more variation of the rate of 
return  for  emerging  than  for  developed  countries.  The  negative  rate  of  return  for 
Philippines  is  troublesome  from  a  theoretical  perspective.  According  to  the  CAPM 
model, this rate of return would indicate a negative risk free interest rate which is not 
possible.  We  will  therefore  exclude  the  Philippines  when  the  risk  premiums  are 
calculated. 
 
Table 3 is a table of summary statistics that confirms the picture given. The world market 
portfolio is significantly a better explaining factor of rate of return in developed than in 
emerging  countries.  Property  rights  protection  is  significantly  higher  in  developed 
countries. Also, property rights protection and the rate of return show a much higher 
variation in emerging countries. 
 
An  interesting  question  is  why  does  the  world  market  portfolio  explain  more  of  the 
national rate of return in developed than in developing countries? We have put forward 
the  hypothesis  that  variables  measuring  the  degree  of  investor  protection  and  secure 
property rights must be included in a CAPM model if differences in national rates of 
return are to be explained. Another explanation that must be statistically checked for 
when  we  test  this  hypothesis  is  if  it  is  simply  the  composition  of  the  world  market 
portfolio that generates this result.  
 
Most  of  the  world  market  portfolio  consists  of  national  portfolios  from  developed 
countries with the USA as most important holding. The national portfolio of the USA 
corresponds  to  as  much  as  almost  half  the  value  of  Morgan  Stanley’s  world  market 
portfolio. This can be compared to the weight of the developing countries which is less 
than five per cent. The simple fact that world portfolio primarily consists of securities 
from  developed  countries  could  be the explanation for the national  differences  in  R
2 
values with higher values for developed than developing countries. 
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Table  4  shows  that  the  correlation  between  the  variables  is  especially  high  between 
property rights and R
2-values, considerably higher than for Index Weights and R
2-values. 
This result does also point to an interpretation that in countries with insecure property 
rights the market portfolio alone does not explain as much of the rate of return as in 
countries with secure rights. And for obvious reasons the property right and investor right 
indexes are highly correlated.      
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Table 3  Summary statistics for the aggregates of developed and emerging 









Rate of return 
















Mean  0.487*  0.194*  1.307*  2.649*  1.43*  1.81*  0.124  0.149 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.170  0.128  0.473  0.749  0.103  0.270  0.043  0.101 
Minimum  0.2  0  1  1  1.31  1.32  0.011  -0.061 
Maximum  0.87  0.44  2.36  4  1.74  2.43  0.221  0.413 
Count  23  26  23  26  23  26  23  26 









Table 4  Correlation matrix 
  R
2  Property rights  Investor rights   Average returns  Index Weights  
R
2  1*         
Property rights  -0.658*  1*       
Investor rights  -0.627*   0.761*  1     
Average returns  -0.071*     0.194*  0.224  1   
Index Weights   0.502*  -0.246*  -0.249  -0.094  1 
* indicates significance at 5 percent.  
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To test if there is a significant link between the R
2-values from the first-pass regression 
and the institutional framework we first check if property right and investor right can be 
used  as  alternative  explanatory  variables.  Then  in  order  to  test  the  robustness  of  the 
results, index weights are included as additional explanatory variable in a second round 
of regressions. In all regressions R
2 from Table 2 is used as dependent variable. Since R
2 




















The results in Table 5a suggest that in countries with weak institutional protection of 
property the systematic economics factors influencing the world market return have less 
explanatory  power.  In  table  5b  it  is  tested  how  robust  these  results  are  when  index 
weights also are used as explanation of the R
2 values. As can be seen the importance of 
property and investor rights as explanatory factors is not changed much. This suggests 
that  the  CAPM  provide  a  less  adequate  tool  for  understanding  asset  pricing  in  less 
developed financial markets.  Therefore we believe that the R
2-values can  be used as 
proxies for financial development; countries in which the CAPM model displays a lower 
explanatory power might be interpreted as less developed financially.  
 
To check for  multicollinearity between the two indices  and the index weights  of the 
world market portfolio we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). In both cases VIF 
is close to one, which means that we can rule out multicollinearity.        
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Table 5a  First pass R
2-values and protection of property  
and investor rights 
  
Property right protection 
(PRP) 
Investor right protection 
(IRP) 
 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
i    Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
 
Property rights  ) ( i PRP   -0.425*  -5.72     




2  0.41    0.34   
Adj. R
2  0.40    0.32   
F-value  32.7    23.8   
No. observations  49    49   
* indicates significance at 1 percent.   
 
 
Table 5b  First pass R
2-values and protection of property  
and investor rights, including index weights 
  
Property right protection 
(PRP) 
Investor right protection 
(IRP) 
 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
i    Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
 
Property rights  ) ( i PRP   -0.381**    -5.23     
Investor rights  ) ( i IRP       -1.171**  -4.36 
Index weights
  0.024**   2.43  0.025**    2.41 
 
R
2  0.48    0.41   
Adj. R
2  0.45    0.39   
F-value  21.0    16.0   
No. observations  49    49   
* indicates significance at 1 percent and ** significance at 5 percent.       
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5. Models and results 
 
In the first step monthly data are used to estimate the first-pass regression as in equation 
4.4. In the second-pass regression the average Heritage and International Country Risk 
Guide indexes of property rights protection are included: 
 
i i PRP i m i i PRP RP RP r          ˆ           (5.1a) 
 
i i IRP i m i i IRP RP RP r          ˆ           (5.1b) 
 
where  i PRP is the average value of the Heritage foundation property right index and 
i IRP is the International Country Risk Guide index of investor protection for a country i 
respectively. We identify the Philippines as an outlier as the average return for the time 
period investigated is negative and consequently exclude it from our regression.  
 
Significant coefficients, RPPRP, for the average value of the Heritage index and RPIRP will 
indicate  that  the  market  portfolio  is  not  the  only  important  explanatory  variable  in 
calculations of a risk premium.  
 
The result of the estimation of the second-pass equation is shown in Table 6. The security 
of  property  rights  turns  out  to  be  important.  The  coefficient  for  PRP  is  statistically 
significant at less than ten percent level and the IRP is significant at five percent. A 
higher degree of insecurity is consistent with a higher cost of capital. Furthermore, the 
signs of the coefficients are positive.  As both the indices have a scale where low values 
indicate  secure  and  high  values  insecure  property  rights  the  estimated  coefficients 
indicate that a higher risk premium has to be offered in countries with insecure property 
rights      
  23 
















  OLS  OLS  OLS 




















   
-0.77 
   
0.079** 
   
2.99 
 
Property rights  ) ( i PRP  
 
0.021** 
     
2.01                 
Investor rights  ) ( i IRP          
 
0.079** 
   
2.20           
 ˆ  
 




0.059**   
 








                         
R
2  0.19        0.21        0.12       
Adj. R
2   0.16        0.17        0.10       
F-value  5.4        5.9        6.4       
No. observations  48        48        48       
* indicates significance at 1 percent and ** significance at 5 percent.  
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With the conventional CAPM model we find that the world risk free interest rate ( ˆ ), is 
on average 8 percent. However, assuming that the countries with the best values on the 
property right index (PRP  = 1) and the investor protection index (IRP  = 1.31) have 
virtually no uncertainty, we find lower risk free interest rates. Using the best values of the 
two risk factors we estimate the risk free rate to be 5.6 percent for the property right 
index and 5.5 percent for the investor right index. The influence of security of property 
rights  is  significant  whichever  of  the  two  indices  we  use.  The  traditional  beta  stays 
approximately the same whatever index is used. This suggests robustness in the result. 
 
Estimated risk premiums for property right protection and investor right protection (plus 
the estimated risk free interest rate) for all the countries are reported in table 7. We find 
on  average  3  percentage  point  difference  in  interest  rates  between  emerging  and 
developed countries, which can be explained by differences in property rights protection. 
A z-test shows that these differences are significant at five percent. The general beta does 
not significantly differ between developed and emerging countries. Hence, the developed 
countries have a much lower risk premium on investments due to the systematic risk that 
the institutional framework represents. Improvement in the institutional framework will 
probably be helpful to more investments and higher welfare. 
 
For  the  conventional  CAPM,  Ramsey’s  regression  specification  error  test  (RESET) 
indicate a problem of omitted variables (F-test 8.23), which supports the inclusion of 
further explanatory variables. This is consistent with the fact that the R
2 and R
2-adjusted 
almost double with the inclusion of the two indexes.       
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Table 7  Risk free rate plus risk premiums 
Developed  
Economies 
Property right premium + α 
 
Investor right premium + α 
 
Australia    0.056  0.078 
Austria    0.056  0.055 
Belgium    0.056  0.061 
Canada    0.056  0.063 
Denmark    0.056  0.067 
Finland    0.056  0.060 
France    0.077  0.064 
Germany    0.056  0.063 
Greece    0.085  0.089 
Hong Kong    0.056  0.076 
Ireland    0.056  0.059 
Italy    0.077  0.071 
Japan    0.064  0.063 
Netherlands    0.056  0.058 
New Zealand    0.056  0.064 
Norway    0.060  0.067 
Portugal    0.077  0.072 
Singapore    0.056  0.059 
Spain    0.083  0.058 
Sweden    0.069  0.069 
Switzerland    0.062  0.058 
United Kingdom    0.056  0.059 








Economies     
Argentina    0.092  0.123 
Brazil    0.098  0.108 
Chile    0.056  0.094 
China    0.119  0.101 
Colombia    0.106  0.063 
Czech Republic    0.077  0.074 
Egypt    0.100  0.102 
Hungary    0.077  0.074 
India    0.098  0.101 
Indonesia    0.107  0.107 
Israel    0.077  0.089 
Jordan    0.085  0.092 
South Korea    0.062  0.073 
Malaysia    0.086  0.082 
Mexico    0.096  0.074 
Morocco    0.100  0.091 
Pakistan    0.102  0.144 
Peru    0.107  0.107 
Poland    0.083  0.081 
Russia    0.106  0.122 
South Africa    0.096  0.078 
Thailand    0.064  0.056 
Taiwan    0.079  0.087 
Turkey    0.085  0.100 







    * indicates that the z-test shows significantly different means at 1 percent       
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6. Conclusions  
 
How to account for institutional risk has not received much attention in models of risk 
and  return  in  the  finance  literature.  A  recent  exception  is  Morck  et  al.  (2000)  who 
explains why R
2:s achieved in first pass regressions in the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) is so low for the US compared to developing countries. Their explanation is that 
legal uncertainty is lower in the US which makes it possible for analysts to get access to 
proprietary firm specific information. This proprietary firm specific information therefore 
influences the stock price more in the US than in developing countries. As a consequence 
CAPM explains less. 
 
We do also find that legal uncertainty is important in the explanation of countrywide 
differences in predictive power of CAPM. But in contrast to Morck et al we use a world 
market portfolio as explanatory variable and study the return on national portfolios. With 
such an approach it is possible to see how cost of capital in different  national stock 
markets is influenced by legal uncertainty. We find that the R
2:s in our case is lower in 
developing  countries  than  in  developed  countries.  Furthermore,  we  find  that  this 
difference in R
2:s can be explained by legal uncertainty in the form of weak property 
rights  and  weak  investor  protection.  When  property  rights  protection  or  investor 
protection are added the predictive power of the CAPM increases substantially and higher 
risk premiums in countries with weaker protection are found. 
       
  27 
References 
 
Black, F., Jensen, M. C. & Scholes, M., (1972), “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some 
Empirical Tests,“ in: Jensen (ed.), Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets, New York: 
Praeger. 
 
Coase, R. H., (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1-
44.  
 
Douglas,  G.,  (1968),  Risk  in  the  Equity  Markets:  An  Empirical  Appraisal  of  Market 
Efficiency, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, Inc. 
 
de Soto, H., (2000), The Mystery of Capital – Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else, Basic Books, New York.  
 
Elton, E. J. & Gruber, M. J., (1995), Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 
5
th ed. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York.  
 
Faure, M. & Skogh, G., (2003), The Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy and 
Law – an introduction, Edgar Elgar. 
 
Friend,  I.,  Landskroner,  Y  &  Losq,  E.,  (1976),  “The  Demand  for  Risky  Assets  and 
Uncertain Inflation,” Journal of Finance 31:1287-1297.      
  28 
 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C. & Yurtoglu, B. B., (2004), Corporate Governance and Return 
on Investment, Journal of Law and Economics, 47(2), 589-633.  
 
Jin,  L.,  Myers,  S.  C.,  (2006),  “R
2  around  the  World:  New  Theory  and  New  Tests,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 79, 257-292.   
 
Kasper, W. & Streit, M. E., (1998), Institutional Economics – Social Order and Public 
Policy, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
 
La  Porta,  R.,  Lopez-De_Silanes,  F.,  Shleifer,  A.  &  Vishny,  R.  W.,  (1997),  Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150.  
 
Merton, R. C., (1973), “An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model,” Econometrica, 
41:867-887. 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B. & Yu, W., (2000), “The Information Content of Stock Markets: 
Why  do  Emerging  Markets  have  Synchronous  Stock  Price  Movements”,  Journal  of 
Financial Economics, vol. 58, 215-260.  
 
Mueller, D. C., (2003), The Corporation – Investments, mergers and growth, Routledge.  
      
  29 
North,  D.  C.,  (1990),  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roll, R., (1977), “A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests: Part I: On Past and 
Potential Testability of the Theory,” Journal of Financial Economics, 4:129-176. 
 
Roll, R., (1988), “R
2” Journal of Finance, vol 43, no. 2, 541-566.  
 
Roll, R., & Ross, S. A., (1980), “An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory”, Journal of Finance, 35:1073-1103.   
 
Ross, S., (1976), “The Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Capital Asset Pricing,” Journal of 
Economic Theory.  
 
Sharpe,  W.  F.  &  Cooper,  G.  M.,  (1972),  “Risk-Return  Class  of  New  York  Stock 
Exchange Common Stocks, 1931-1967,” Financial Analysts Journal, 28:46-52. 
 
 